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(DIGITAL) TRESPASS: WHAT’S OLD IS NEW AGAIN
HANNAH L. COOK†
A digital trespass theory of Fourth Amendment searches is necessary to maintain the relevance of the Supreme Court’s decision in United
States v. Jones.1 At the time the Fourth Amendment was written, if a
government official wanted to track a suspect, he needed to physically
follow the suspect around to learn his whereabouts. If he wanted to read
a suspect’s correspondence, he needed to enter the suspect’s home or
office and take the physical letter. If he wanted to listen to a suspect’s
conversation, he needed to hide under an open window or find an informant. In 2017, these tactics are no longer necessary—we use electronics to travel, write, and speak with one another. Unfortunately, these devices can betray us without any physical interaction with law enforcement, potentially confounding a Fourth Amendment whose authors never
imagined law enforcement conducting a remote search and eviscerating
the progress made in Jones.
This article provides a solution to the problem of remote digital
searches by proposing a theory of digital trespass, in which it is a search
when law enforcement trespasses with technology by sending a targeted
electronic signal that causes a device to take an action. This action could
be sending information back to the government or changing how the
device functions for the user. Part I of this article discusses early Fourth
Amendment law grounded in trespass and the Supreme Court’s later
move away from trespass. Part II discusses the return of trespass in United States v. Jones, demonstrating how the expansion of the Jones theory
to digital trespass would unify current case law. Part III briefly discusses
how a digital trespass theory is consistent with the principles of Katz v.
United States.2
I. FROM TRESPASS TO REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY:
OLMSTEAD AND KATZ
In criminal law, whether a search has occurred is a critical finding:
if there is no search, the defendant has no Fourth Amendment rights.
During the early twentieth century, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence
emphasized the need for a physical trespass in order for a law enforce-

† Law Clerk, U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Many thanks to Kevin
Benish for his helpful commentary on this article. All views expressed are strictly the author’s.
1. 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
2. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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ment action to qualify as a search under the Fourth Amendment.3 However, in 1967 the Court rejected the trespass theory in favor of a more
flexible reasonable expectation of privacy test. This section describes the
early trespass test and its demise.
A. Olmstead’s Trespass Rationale
In Olmstead v. United States,4 the Supreme Court emphasized that
the Fourth Amendment protects physical things from physical trespass.5
“The Amendment itself shows that the search is to be of material
things—the person, the house, his papers or his effects,” wrote Chief
Justice Taft.6 This focus on the physical objects examined led the Court
to conclude that a wiretap was not a search when the tapped wires were
outside the defendant’s property.7 After all, the “intervening wires are
not part of [the defendant’s] house or office, any more than are the highways along which they are stretched,” so the defendant had no property
interest in the wires and he and his effects were not searched.8 This emphasis on trespass changed with the decision in Katz v. United States in
1967.
B. Katz and Reasonable Expectations of Privacy
In Katz, the government recorded the defendant’s phone calls from
a public phone booth using a tape recorder attached to the top of the
phone booth.9 Katz challenged the recordings as a warrantless search in
violation of the Fourth Amendment, even though there had been no trespass against his private property. The Court concluded that “the underpinnings of Olmstead and Goldman have been so eroded by our subsequent decisions that the ‘trespass’ doctrine there enunciated can no longer be regarded as controlling.”10 This explicit rejection of the trespass test
led to the adoption of a two-part test, proposed in Katz by Justice Harlan.
Under this test, a search occurs if “a person exhibit[s] an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation [is] one that
society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”11 This reasonable expectation of privacy test replaced the trespass test in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence for 45 years until Jones.
3. See Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 134 (1942) (holding police action could
become an illegal search through “trespass or unlawful entry”).
4. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
5. Id. at 464.
6. Id. Note that in the case of digital trespass, the physical device itself is being provoked to
respond and reveal information, so the focus on interaction with physical objects remains similar to
that in Olmstead.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 465. The Court noted that a trespass was not always sufficient for a search (as in the
case where two police officers snuck onto a man’s land and saw him come outside and hand a bottle
to a friend). Id. However, it appeared there could not be a search without a trespass. See id.
9. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 348 (1967).
10. Id. at 353.
11. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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II. TO JONES AND BEYOND: EXPANDING PHYSICAL TRESPASS TO
DIGITAL TRESPASS
The primacy of the Katz test was thrown into question by the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Jones. Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia reinvigorated the Olmstead trespass doctrine, at least in
so far as trespass was an independent ground on which to find a search
under the Fourth Amendment.12 This part briefly explains the Court’s
reasoning in Jones and proposes expanding Jones to digital trespass—
trespasses that take place entirely electronically by sending a targeted
signal to a suspect’s device to make it take some action. Second, it discusses a sample of Fourth Amendment cases and explains how digital
trespass provides a harmonizing theory.
A. Jones Revives Trespass Doctrine—And Potentially Creates Digital
Trespass
In Jones, the defendant challenged the government’s secret installation of a Global Positioning System (GPS) on the bottom of the car he
used as a warrantless search in violation of the Fourth Amendment.13 The
GPS sent the police data tracking Jones’s movements for twenty-eight
days, conveying more than 2,000 pages of data.14 Although lower courts
had previously found that GPS data generated by cell phone usage15 was
not necessarily covered by the Fourth Amendment (and therefore its use
was not a search),16 the Supreme Court found that the installation and use
of the GPS was a search under the Fourth Amendment.
In his majority opinion, Justice Scalia concluded that a “physical intrusion” like the installation and use of the GPS, independent of the reasonable expectation of privacy, was a sufficient basis to find a search

12. One caveat to this characterization is that a trespass is only a search if information is
actually discovered. The mere installation of the GPS, if it had malfunctioned and not transmitted
data, would likely not have been a search, especially since the main remedy for a Fourth Amendment
violation is suppression of the evidence (and if the installation fails, there is no evidence to suppress). See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 712 (1984) (“A holding to that effect would mean
that a policeman walking down the street carrying a parabolic microphone capable of picking up
conversations in nearby homes would be engaging in a search even if the microphone were not
turned on.”).
13. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 402–04 (2012). The police had actually received a
warrant, but did not follow the terms of its installation or use, so the Court proceeded as if there was
no warrant.
14. Id.
15. Like the GPS in Jones, the phone conveys its location to a satellite, which is then reported
back to a computer. See id. at 403.
16. See In re the Matter of the Appl. of the United States for an Order Directing Provider of
Elec. Commun. Serv. to Disclose Records to the Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 319 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding
request to company for GPS data does not require a warrant because it is not a search); see also In re
Appl. of the United States for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 615 (5th Cir. 2013) (holding
GPS data disclosed by a provider is not a search).
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under the Fourth Amendment.17Although Justice Scalia acknowledged
that the Court’s post-Katz jurisprudence had “deviated from th[e] exclusively property-based approach” used in Olmstead, he concluded that
“Katz did not repudiate [the trespass-based] understanding” of the Fourth
Amendment.18 In fact, for “most of our history the Fourth Amendment was understood to embody a particular concern for government
trespass upon the areas (‘persons, houses, papers, and effects’) it enumerates.”19
Although this trespass approach reached the reasonable result in
Jones itself, it creates an intriguing problem noted by both concurrences—that a digital trespass may soon allow law enforcement to receive
identical GPS data about a vehicle without law enforcement physically
installing a GPS.20 Many cars now come with GPS devices built into the
vehicle to assist with navigation and accident response, such as the popular OnStar system (which tracks a car’s location and speed by default
even if the owner is not a paying OnStar customer).21 A government
agent that remotely accessed a car’s GPS so that it provided location data
to a government computer would never have to commit a physical trespass.
However, Jones’s trespass theory need not be confined to physical
trespasses, and expanding it to digital trespasses provides a logical theory
for current and future case law. A digital trespass takes place whenever a
government agent sends a targeted signal to a user’s device, causing the
device to return some information or take some action.22 Note that the
requirement of a targeted signal to a device eliminates the potential for
digital plain view23 as well as the issue of dragnet surveillance. This digi-

17. Jones, 565 U.S. at 404 (“The Government physically occupied private property for the
purpose of obtaining information. We have no doubt that such a physical intrusion would have been
considered a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it was adopted.”).
18. Id. at 405.
19. Id.
20. See id. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“In cases of electronic or other novel modes of
surveillance that do not depend upon a physical invasion on property, the majority opinion's trespassory test may provide little guidance.”); id. at 426 (Alito, J., concurring) (“[T]he Court's reliance on
the law of trespass will present particularly vexing problems in cases involving surveillance that is
carried out by making electronic, as opposed to physical, contact with the item to be tracked.”).
21. David Kravets, OnStar Tracks Your Car Even When You Cancel Service, WIRED (Sept.
20, 2011), http://www.wired.com/2011/09/onstar-tracks-you/.
22. For example, the device could return its location or provide a copy of all IP addresses
visited by the device. See, e.g., Kim Zetter, Secrets of FBI Smartphone Surveillance Tool Revealed
in Court Fight, WIRED (Apr. 09, 2013), http://www.wired.com/2013/04/verizon-rigmaidenaircard/all/ (explaining the use of government configured aircard to return device’s location).
23. Which, for example, might have been available if the government rather than Google had
accessed the unencrypted wireless traffic in Joffe v. Google, 746 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 2013). The plain
view exception to the Fourth Amendment has a complicated relationship with computers. Compare
United States v. Williams, 592 F.3d 511, 521 (4th Cir. 2010) (holding plain view exception allows
search of every file on a hard drive) with United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268 (10th Cir. 1999)
(holding plain view exception does not allow search of every file on a hard drive). This debate is
beyond the scope of this article.
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tal trespass theory is consistent with existing trespass law and existing
criminal law involving computer access.
Trespass law has never been confined to when a person physically
intrudes on another’s private property—it is sufficient that the trespasser
has physical or legal control over the intrusion. For example, at common
law, a trespass by livestock was an almost strict liability tort by the livestock owner—if Smith’s cow went onto Jones’s property and injured
Jones, Smith could be liable even if he was not negligent in confining the
cow and never set foot on Jones’s land.24 Trespass cases due to pollution
are common; in many of these cases the trespasser never set foot on the
contaminated land.25 If an undirected animal or cloud of pollution interacting with another’s property can be a trespass, it is hard to imagine
why a directed wireless signal interacting with another’s property would
be any less of a trespass.
Furthermore, the idea of being able to trespass digitally on a computer, and using a computer or other technology to do so, is not novel.26
Some states have criminalized “computer trespass” by statute.27 Although the federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act does not use the term
“trespass,” it uses similar language to the state statutes.28 While there is
an active scholarly debate about whether computer crimes should be understood in terms of physical trespass or not,29 it is clear that trespass is a
viable framework for conceptualizing gaining access to, or information
from, electronic devices.
Furthermore, courts have accepted the idea that one could commit a
computer trespass using other technology, rather than physically sitting
down at the computer and attempting to access it. For example, in State

24. See James L. Rigelhaupt, Jr., Liability for Personal Injury or Death Caused by Trespassing or Intruding Livestock, 49 A.L.R. 4th 710, § 3(a) (2012) (“the possessor of livestock may be held
liable under the rule of strict liability, in actions based on a theory of trespass, for personal injuries
caused by their animals while intruding on the lands of others”).
25. See 5-17 THE LAW OF HAZARDOUS WASTE § 17.01 (2015) (collecting cases); see also Jill
E. Evans, See Repose Run: Setting the Boundaries of the Rule of Repose in Environmental Trespass
and Nuisance Cases, 38 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 119, 132 (2013) (“As a result, a
number of environmental trespass and nuisance cases involve the unseen migration of pollutants
through ground soil or groundwater onto adjoining property.”).
26. The difference between using a computer to trespass and trespassing on a computer is
trivial, since generally there will be computer-like technology on both ends of a digital trespass.
27. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.52.110 (repealed 2016) (“A person is guilty of computer trespass in the first degree if the person, without authorization, intentionally gains access to a
computer system . . . and . . . [t]he access is made with the intent to commit another crime[] or . . .
[t]he violation involves a computer or database maintained by a government agency.”).
28. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (“Whoever . . . intentionally accesses a
computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access, and thereby obtains . . . information
from any department or agency of the United States[] or . . . information from any protected computer . . . shall be punished as provided in subsection (c) of this section.”).
29. See Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope: Interpreting “Access” and “Authorization” in
Computer Misuse Statutes, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1596, 1618-22 (2003) (arguing trespass is an insufficient analogy for computer crime).
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v. Riley,30 the Washington Supreme Court held that the defendant had
committed a computer trespass by calling a telephone company’s general
access number and dialing random numbers to discover access codes to
the company’s computer system (which allowed the defendant to make
long-distance calls while charging them to other customers).31 The defendant unsuccessfully argued that he should be charged with telephone
fraud, rather than computer trespass, because he did not directly access
the data on the computer—he just entered numbers on his phone and
learned whether he was able to make long-distance calls after entering
the numbers.32 The court rejected this argument, noting that Riley had
“accessed” the computer in violation of the statute by “approach[ing]” or
“mak[ing] use of any resources of a computer.”33 A digital trespass takes
a similar form—using one piece of technology (be it a computer or more
specialized device such as a Stingray34) to make use of the resources of
another piece of technology.
B. Harmonizing Precedent with Digital Trespass
Supreme Court precedent is already consistent in many ways with
the digital trespass theory described above. For example, the theory is
consistent with the Court’s decisions in United States v. Karo35 and United States v. Knotts.36 Karo and Knotts are befuddling. The two cases,
decided less than two years apart, come to opposite conclusions about
very similar facts. Although neither could be considered a search under
the digital trespass theory due to the technology at stake, the theory is
consistent with the logic underlying both decisions.
In Knotts, the Supreme Court found it was not a search when government agents inserted a tracking beeper, which emitted radio signals
that could be picked up by radio receivers, into a container of chloroform
being transported by Knotts.37 The court found there was no search because the beeper was not relaying any new information to law enforcement—the beeper was only assisting law enforcement in their visual surveillance of the suspect as he transported the chloroform.38 This would
not be a search under a digital trespass theory either. The government
receiver is not sending a targeting signal—the beeper simply emits data
that can be picked up by anyone, and the government does not “ping” the
beeper to ask it to return data (the beeper transmits constantly). In to30. 846 P.2d 1365 (Wash. 1993).
31. Id. at 1373.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. For a discussion of how Stingrays can be used to gather information by law enforcement,
see United States v. Patrick, 842 F.3d 540, 547 (7th Cir. 2016) (Wood, dissenting).
35. 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
36. 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
37. Id. at 277.
38. Id. at 281 (“The governmental surveillance conducted by means of the beeper in this case
amounted principally to the following of an automobile on public streets and highways.”).

2017]

(DIGITAL) TRESPASS

7

day’s terms, replacing “beeper” and “receiver” with “computer” illustrates one limitation incorporated by the digital trespass theory, which is
consistent with Knotts—if the government can pick up information that
is being freely broadcast using a standard-issue receiver, it is not a
search.
In Karo, the government inserted a similar beeper into a can of ether
and had an informant swap the beeper can with one of the cans Karo was
transporting.39 Although the Court conceded there may have been a
“technical trespass,” they found the beeper’s installation was not a search
because the informant had agreed when the can was in his possession and
the government had created only the “potential for an invasion of privacy.”40 However, the Court held that it was a search to use the beeper to
gain locational information once the beeper was off public roads and on
the defendant’s property.41 This focus on gaining access to otherwise
unavailable (at least without a warrant) information is also reflected in
the digital trespass test—the government’s targeted signal must be effective in inducing a response from the suspect’s device. The government’s
mere ability to ask a device for information cannot logically constitute a
search, unless it actually asks for information from a device and receives
it.42
Digital trespass carries forward Knotts’s and Karo’s themes that the
government cannot turn a person’s property into an informant, while
placing reasonable restrictions on what government behavior falls into
that category. Knotts and Karo teach that a digital trespass requires government officials to reach out and ask a device for nonpublic information. The modern analogue to the continually transmitting beeper on
public roadways in Knotts is information shared on an unsecured wireless network.43 The government need not ask the device to do anything in
order to gain this information, just as the officers performed no physical
trespass to follow Knotts.
In addition to this outreach requirement, as the previous analogy
suggests, the government must gain new information. Not only has the
government failed to ask for anything in the wireless network example, it
is not receiving nonpublic information—it is simply following our modern-day Karo down public information superhighways. Once the government moves to the private level of the device and has the device re39. Karo, 468 U.S. at 708.
40. Id. at 712.
41. Id. at 715.
42. This approach is also consistent with lower court approaches to GPS data. For example,
the Fifth Circuit found that government’s request for historical cell site data were not a search because the cell phone companies generate and keep locational data for their own business purposes
and the government was not involved in their generation or retention. In re Application of the United
States for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 611–12 (5th Cir. 2013).
43. See United States v. Stanley, 753 F.3d 114, 114 (3d Cir. 2014) (finding no search where
defendant’s computer was located through its connection to an unsecured wireless network).
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turn information that was not being shared, the government has stepped
off the highway and onto the private property (for instance, the hard
drive). At that point, the government has committed a trespassing search
as in Karo.
III. DIGITAL TRESPASS AND FOURTH AMENDMENT VALUES
Although the majority in Jones noted that “Katz did not narrow the
Fourth Amendment’s scope” and the Olmstead test provides an independent basis for finding a search,44 the digital trespass test is consistent
with the reasonable expectation of privacy test that dominated a halfcentury of precedent. At least one court has disagreed, finding that a defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his devices
when the government used technology to find and reprogram his aircard
(a way of wirelessly accessing the internet from a laptop).45 However, the
digital trespass test is consistent with the Katz test. Furthermore, it protects the notice interest reflected in both statutory law and the values of
Katz.
As discussed above, the Katz test requires a subjective expectation
of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.46 Especially in an age where so many programs and apps default to sharing (consider, for example, when a PC asks if the user would like to share his or
her files upon joining a wireless network or more insidious sharing defaults within social media applications), the user’s decision to not broadcast certain information is good evidence of a subjective expectation of
privacy.47 Moreover, the public has expressed outrage at government
monitoring of electronic devices such as computers and GPS-enabled
phones. One Gallup poll found that 53% of Americans disapprove of the
government “compil[ing] telephone call logs and Internet communications” while the same study found 57% would be somewhat or very concerned their privacy rights had been violated if they were surveilled electronically.48 This concern has manifested itself in calls for greater en44. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 951 (2012).
45. United States v. Rigmaiden, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65633, at *25–26 (D. Ariz. May 8,
2013). The court’s opinion is not a model of clear reasoning and includes the fact that the devices
were used in an “extensive scheme of fraud” as a reason to deny a reasonable expectation of privacy.
Presumably use in a crime cannot dictate the boundaries of the Fourth Amendment, because otherwise criminals would never have Fourth Amendment rights.
46. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
47. Whether unsecured file sharing or wireless networks eliminates a reasonable expectation
of privacy is an undecided topic. Compare United States v. Ahrndt, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7223 (D.
Or. Jan. 17, 2013) (finding search despite having shared files with wireless network) with United
States v. Stanley, 753 F.3d 114 (3d Cir. 2014) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in
location of computer after connecting to unsecured wireless network). Under either standard, the use
of a secured network and applications to prevent dissemination of information reflects a subjective
expectation of privacy.
48. Frank Newport, Americans Disapprove of Government Surveillance Programs, GALLUP
(June
12,
2013)
http://www.gallup.com/poll/163043/americans-disapprove-governmentsurveillance-programs.aspx.
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cryption of cell phones and other devices, as Representative Ted Lieu
recently noted during hearings on encryption.49 It seems clear from these
statistics that the public is prepared to recognize, and believes it has, an
expectation of privacy in the information collected by electronic devices.
Under these circumstances, the Katz test is satisfied and government’s
technical manipulation to gain the information on these devices is a
search.
Finally, the digital trespass rule protects individuals from unknown,
and perhaps unknowable, searches of their electronic devices. When police perform a search under the Katz test, they must get a warrant (or
consent), which informs the person that a search is taking place. Otherwise a person can assume that her information is safe and conduct her
business accordingly. Recognizing this interest in people knowing when
they are being monitored, statutes such as the Stored Communications
Act (which covers electronic communications data not protected by the
Fourth Amendment) require notice to the target.50 These notice provisions are essential, as otherwise citizens might curtail their activities just
in case they are being surveilled.51
A digital trespass theory of Fourth Amendment searches is necessary to maintain the relevance of the Supreme Court’s Jones decision in
an age of increasingly pervasive technology. Although a physical trespass may no longer be necessary to track our movements, communications, or contacts, the government is still taking a targeted action to acquire information it could not otherwise gather. Neither existing trespass
law, existing criminal law, nor existing Fourth Amendment law bars the
expansion of Jones to digital trespasses. Doing so would protect the privacy of Americans in the twenty-first century and ensure our actions
remain unconstrained by the fear of secret surveillance.

49. Cyrus Farivar, Irate Congressman Gives Cops Easy Rule: “Just Follow the Damn Constitution,” WIRED (Apr. 30, 2015), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/04/30/irate-congressmangives-cops-easy-rule-just-follow-the-damn-constitution/.
50. This notice can be delayed up to 90 days after the surveillance if certain conditions are
met. 18 U.S.C. § 2705.
51. There is evidence journalists have changed their behavior in response to the disclosure of
NSA surveillance programs. With Liberty to Monitor All: How Large Scale US Surveillance is
Harming Journalism, Law, and American Democracy, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (July 2014),
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/dem14-withlibertytomonitorall07282014.pdf.

